Simulation: Comparing Electoral Systems
Question: Which of these Four (4) Electoral Systems are best at Uniformly Balancing the Interests of the voters?
Test Your Knowledge
This Webpage and Video Have a Quiz you can take to test your knowledge and understanding of the content. This lesson is part of a larger education series.
Vote Share
The interests of individuals in jurisdictions are multifaceted and subject to change. The selection mechanism for their representatives should distort this diversity of interests as little as possible to minimize consent violations and balance interests uniformly.
Seat Control
the allocation of seats in the governing body based on the vote share. It should mirror the vote share proportionally to ensure that the governing body accurately represents the preferences of the electorate. This alignment prevents any distortion of the people's will.
Committee Control
Seats within committees are distributed among factions. Like Seat Control, Committee Control aims to proportionally reflect the vote share within the committees, which are crucial for detailed legislative work. Proper Committee Control ensures that the influence within committees matches the factions' electoral support, maintaining balanced decision-making across all governance levels.
Autocratic Voting
Pick One (1), One (1) Winner
The Prevailing Power Structure controls who can stand for election and who can vote. Additional obstacles to suppress opposition are implemented by the power structure to maintain the status quo.
Plurality Voting (FPTP)
Pick One (1), One (1) Winner
Plurality Voting, also known as First Past the Post Voting, is a method where the option selected with the most votes win.
Ranked Choice Voting (RCV)
Rank up to All, One (1) Winner
Voters rank their candidates putting a 1 next to their first choice, 2 next to their 2nd choice and so on. If the voters preferred candidate is eliminated, their votes are distributed to the remaining preferred candidates.
Proportional Ranked Choice Voting (PR-RCV)
Rank up to All, Multi-Winner [>=5]
PR-RCV is similar to RCV except there are multiple winners. This can be accomplished by increasing the number of winners per district OR by combining several districts into one larger district.
Autocratic Voting
Pick One (1), One (1) Winner
The Prevailing Power Structure controls who can stand for election and who can vote. Additional obstacles to suppress opposition are implemented by the power structure to maintain the status quo.
| Leader Appointment |
|---|
| Candidate | Faction | Count | Vote Share |
|---|---|---|---|
| A | 🟥 Red | 50,000 | 5% |
| B | 🟧 Orange | 250,000 | 25% |
| D | 🟨 Yellow | 200,000 | 20% |
| F | 🟩 Green | 120,000 | 12% |
| G | 🟦 Blue | 300,000 | 30% |
| J | 🟪 Purple | 80,000 | 8% |
Autocratic Vote Share
In this example B🟧(Orange) , D🟨(Yellow) , and G🟦(Blue) are disqualified as they are a threat to the incumbency of F🟩(Green) .
Autocratic Outcome
The remaining candidates follow Plurality voting. All viable challengers have been removed with only fringe token opposition candidates remaining.
Autocratic Seat Control
As a result, F🟩(Green) continues to stay in power.
Autocratic Committee Control
Suppression of Free Speech and Information
Ensures only positive messages about the status quo are permitted and minority groups are branded enemies if they petition for equal treatment under the law.
Suppression of the right to vote
Uses the rule of law to justify taking rights away from criminals then is incentivized to make things crimes for the purpose of maintaining power and suppressing dissent. Forced labor classes and an industry to manage them emerge.
The rulers are not subject to the ruled
There is no incentive to invest in the individuals ruled and the ruling body rules through fear and force. This depresses voter turnout and leads to increased levels of disengagement.
Plurality Voting (FPTP)
Pick One (1), One (1) Winner
Plurality Voting, also known as First Past the Post Voting, is a method where the option selected with the most votes win.
| Candidate Selection |
|---|
| Candidate | Faction | Count | Vote Share |
|---|---|---|---|
| A | 🟥 Red | 50,000 | 5% |
| B | 🟧 Orange | 250,000 | 25% |
| D | 🟨 Yellow | 200,000 | 20% |
| F | 🟩 Green | 120,000 | 12% |
| G | 🟦 Blue | 300,000 | 30% |
| J | 🟪 Purple | 80,000 | 8% |
Plurality Vote Share
A Majority (over 50%) is NOT required to win in this system.
Plurality Outcome
Regardless of the number of options, the choice with the most votes prevails over all others even if the choice itself has non-majority support.
Plurality Seat Control
In this example G🟦(Blue) triumphs over 70% of voters with 30% support.
Plurality Committee Control
Problems At Scale over Time
Voters compromise their own interests and coalesce permanently under a single identity and banner after each election until two permanent camps emerge and swap power between themselves over time.
1st Election Cycle
Blue🟦 wins with 30% of the vote, capitalizing on the divided opposition. In response, 🟨 Yellow decides to merge with Orange🟧 for the next election, aiming to strengthen their combined position.
| Faction | Count | Vote Share |
|---|---|---|
| 🟥 Red | 50,000 | 5% |
| 🟧 Orange | 250,000 | 25% |
| 🟨 Yellow | 200,000 | 20% |
| 🟩 Green | 120,000 | 12% |
| 🟦 Blue | 300,000 | 30% |
| 🟪 Purple | 80,000 | 8% |
2nd Election Cycle
In the second election, Orange🟧 wins with 45% of the vote, thanks to the support from 🟨 Yellow. In response, Blue🟦 and Purple🟪 consolidate with Green🟩for the next cycle, aiming to build a stronger coalition.
| Faction | Count | Vote Share |
|---|---|---|
| 🟥 Red | 50,000 | 5% |
| 🟧 Orange | 450,000 | 45% |
| 🟩 Green | 120,000 | 12% |
| 🟦 Blue | 300,000 | 30% |
| 🟪 Purple | 80,000 | 8% |
3rd Election Cycle
Orange🟧 loses with 45%, as Blue🟦 wins with 50%, leveraging the vote split caused by Red🟥. Following this, Red🟥 consolidates under Orange🟧, resulting in a two-party system in subsequent cycles.
| Faction | Count | Vote Share |
|---|---|---|
| 🟥 Red | 50,000 | 5% |
| 🟧 Orange | 450,000 | 45% |
| 🟦 Blue | 500,000 | 50% |
Two Party Deadlock
In subsequent Election Cycles, two parties consolidate power and are incentivized to keep it for themselves. Power balances on a razor's edge in an escalating arms race of opposing ideologies.
| Faction | Count | Vote Share |
|---|---|---|
| 🟧 Orange | 510,000 | 49% |
| 🟦 Blue | 490,000 | 51% |
| Faction | Count | Vote Share |
|---|---|---|
| 🟧 Orange | 490,000 | 49% |
| 🟦 Blue | 510,000 | 51% |
The Spoiler Effect
Plurality voting makes it impossible for alternate voices to be heard by making less established factions unelectable.
| Faction | Count | Vote Share |
|---|---|---|
| 🟧 Orange | 500,000 | 50% |
| 🟦 Blue | 450,000 | 45% |
| 🟪 Purple | 50,000 | 5% |
Every time a small party gains traction, the vote breaks in favor of the ideological opposite of the smaller party.
| Faction | Count | Vote Share |
|---|---|---|
| 🟧 Orange | 470,000 | 47% |
| 🟨 Yellow | 30,000 | 3% |
| 🟩 Green | 20,000 | 2% |
| 🟦 Blue | 480,000 | 48% |
Under Plurality Voting, voting for one’s actual interests is disincentivized.
| Faction | Count | Vote Share |
|---|---|---|
| 🟥 Red | 50,000 | 5% |
| 🟧 Orange | 450,000 | 45% |
| 🟦 Blue | 500,000 | 50% |
Autocratic Emergence
Over time democratic rule decays into autocratic rule and it’s accompanying consequences.
Strategic District Drawing
Power structures draw electoral maps so that future election results are likely to favor the status quo. This leads to autocratic election outcomes in most areas, resulting in government structures being unaccountable to the governed.
| Faction | Count | Vote Share |
|---|---|---|
| 🟧 Orange | 600,000 | 60% |
| 🟦 Blue | 400,000 | 40% |
Strategic Configuration 1
In this configuration, the districts are drawn in such a way that Orange🟧, despite having 60% of the vote, wins all 5 districts, effectively locking out Blue🟦 from representation entirely.
| 🟧 Orange | 🟦 Blue |
|---|---|
| 5 | 0 |
Strategic Configuration 2
This configuration creates a slightly more balanced distribution, where Orange🟧 wins 3 districts and Blue🟦 wins 2. Here, the district lines are drawn to ensure that Orange🟧 retains a majority but allows some representation for Blue🟦.
| 🟧 Orange | 🟦 Blue |
|---|---|
| 3 | 2 |
Strategic Configuration 3
In this configuration, the districts are manipulated to favor Blue🟦 with 3 districts, while Orange🟧 wins only 2, despite Orange🟧 having a majority of the overall vote (60%). This is achieved by spreading Orange🟧 voters thinly across more districts while concentrating Blue🟦 voters in just enough districts to secure a win.
| 🟧 Orange | 🟦 Blue |
|---|---|
| 2 | 3 |
Defund Election Infrastructure
For the districts that are not predictable, or are predictably against the status quo, voting infrastructure can be removed, and barriers to voting and standing for office are put in place.
Target Rival Interests for Disenfranchisement
Target behaviors or attributes commonly associated with members of rival political blocks. Make it illegal and use it as a pretense to remove the right to vote.
Poll Taxes and Hidden Fees
Exploit Financial hardships in the most likely to be upset with the status quo to keep as many from voting as possible.
Non-Automatic Registration
Disenfranchisement via technical paperwork that need not exist in the first place.
Unsubsidized Identification Requirements
When combined with Registration Fees and Travel requirements, acquiring identification documents is a financial and time burden that applies disproportionately against those not benefiting in the status quo.
Ranked Choice Voting (RCV)
Rank up to All, One (1) Winner
Voters rank their candidates putting a 1 next to their first choice, 2 next to their 2nd choice and so on. If the voters preferred candidate is eliminated, their votes are distributed to the remaining preferred candidates.
| Rank | Candidate Selection |
|---|---|
| 1st Choice | |
| 2nd Choice | |
| 3rd Choice | |
| 4th Choice | |
| 5th Choice | |
| 6th Choice | |
| Candidate | Faction | Votes | Share |
|---|---|---|---|
| D | 🟨 Yellow | 200,000 | (50%) |
| - F | - 🟩 Green | 110,000 | 11% |
| - J | - 🟪 Purple | 10,000 | 1% |
| - B | - 🟧 Orange | 160,000 | 16% |
| - A | - 🟥 Red | 20,000 | 2% |
| G | 🟦 Blue | 300,000 | (39%) |
| - J | - 🟪 Purple | 30,000 | 3% |
| - B | - 🟧 Orange | 50,000 | 5% |
| - A | - 🟥 Red | 10,000 | 1% |
| - | Dropped | 110,000 | 11% |
RCV Vote Share
After voters rank their candidates, the candidate with the least votes is eliminated first and their voters 2nd choice votes are redistributed.
RCV Outcome
Unlike Plurality Voting, Ranked Choice Voting gives voters alternative choices. However, as shown below, large percentages of the population are still locked out of government at any given time.
RCV Seat Control
In this example, D🟨(Yellow) is aware that their victory was due in part to the support from F🟩(Green), J🟪(Purple), B🟧(Orange), and A🟥(Red).
RCV Committee Control
Processing Ranked Choice Results
After voters rank their candidates, the candidate with the least votes is eliminated first and their voters 2nd choice votes are redistributed. This process repeats until One (1) Candidate reaches a majority or there is only one candidate standing. Unlike two-round voting (not depicted), voters are able to rank their choices in a single ballot rather than having to return to the polls to vote in a second ballot. In this example, voters from other factions coalesced around D🟨(Yellow) to achieve victory of major rivals G🟦(Blue) and B🟧(Orange).
RCV Round 1
A🟥(Red) has the fewest votes and is eliminated. Their votes are redistributed to voters' next preferences.
RCV Round 2
In the second round, B🟧(Orange) received 40,000 votes from A🟥(Red), while 10,000 votes were dropped due to no further preferences. The next candidate to be eliminated is J🟪(Purple).
RCV Round 3
In the third round, F🟩(Green) received 40,000 votes (4%) from J🟪(Purple), G🟦(Blue) received 30,000 votes (3%) from J🟪(Purple), and 10,000 votes (1%) were dropped. The next candidate to be eliminated is F🟩(Green).
RCV Round 4
In the fourth round, D🟨(Yellow) received 100,000 votes (10%) from F🟩(Green), which includes 10,000 votes (1%) from the third-choice voters of J🟪(Purple). B🟧(Orange) received 10,000 votes (1%) from F🟩(Green). The rest of J🟪(Purple) and 10,000 votes (1%) from F🟩(Green) were dropped, bringing the dropped total to 60,000 votes (6%). The next candidate to be eliminated is B🟧(Orange).
RCV Round 5
In the fifth and final round, D🟨(Yellow) received 160,000 votes (16%) from B🟧(Orange) and 20,000 votes (2%) from A🟥(Red)'s third-choice voters, securing a total of 50% and winning the election. G🟦(Blue) received 50,000 votes (5%) from B🟧(Orange) and 10,000 votes (1%) from A🟥(Red)'s third-choice voters. The remaining votes were dropped, increasing the dropped total to 11%.
Two Party Deadlock
Like in FPTP, under RCV Factions are forced to strategically vote to gain a competitive edge. However, unlike FPTP, the Spoiler Effect is not present.
| Faction | Count | Vote Share |
|---|---|---|
| 🟧 Orange | 510,000 | 49% |
| 🟦 Blue | 490,000 | 51% |
Strategic District Drawing
Because RCV also tends toward two parties, Power structures under RCV can draw electoral maps so that future election results are likely to favor the status quo.
| Faction | Count | Vote Share |
|---|---|---|
| 🟧 Orange | 600,000 | 60% |
| 🟦 Blue | 400,000 | 40% |
| 🟧 Orange | 🟦 Blue |
|---|---|
| 2 | 3 |
Proportional Ranked Choice Voting (PR-RCV)
Rank up to All, Multi-Winner [>=5]
PR-RCV is similar to RCV except there are multiple winners. This can be accomplished by increasing the number of winners per district OR by combining several districts into one larger district.
| Rank | Candidate Selection |
|---|---|
| 1st Choice | |
| 2nd Choice | |
| 3rd Choice | |
| 4th Choice | |
| 5th Choice | |
| 6th Choice | |
| 7th Choice | |
| 8th Choice | |
| 9th Choice | |
| 10th Choice | |
| Candidate | Faction | Count | Share |
|---|---|---|---|
| B | 🟧 Orange | 170,000 | (20%) |
| A | - 🟥 Red | 30,000 | 3% |
| D | 🟨 Yellow | 110,000 | (20%) |
| E | - 🟨 Yellow | 90,000 | 9% |
| F | 🟩 Green | 120,000 | (20%) |
| C | - 🟧 Orange | 70,000 | 7% |
| A | - 🟥 Red | 10,000 | 1% |
| G | 🟦 Blue | 200,000 | (20%) |
| J | 🟪 Purple | 80,000 | (15%) |
| I | - 🟦 Blue | 20,000 | 2% |
| G | - 🟦 Blue | 40,000 | 4% |
| H | - 🟦 Blue | 10,000 | 1% |
| · | Dropped | 50,000 | 5% |
PR-RCV Vote Share
For this Sample Ballot there are Five (5) seats available. Therefore, a Candidate must get 100% divided by 5 (or 20%) to win.
PR-RCV Outcome
The candidate with the least votes is eliminated first and their voters 2nd choice votes are redistributed.
PR-RCV Seat Control
This process repeats until all available seats have been filled or there are no candidates remaining.
PR-RCV Committee Control
In this Sample Ballot, B🟧(Orange), D🟨(Yellow), F🟩(Green), G🟦(Blue) , and J🟪(Purple) were able to get seats thanks in part to their primary supporters, and in part to supporters in different factions.
Processing Proprotional Ranked Choice Results
Like in Ranked Choice Voting (RCV), the candidate with the least votes is eliminated first and their voters 2nd choice votes are redistributed. This process repeats until all available seats have been filled or there are no candidates remaining. However, if someone has MORE than the required number of votes, those extra votes get distributed before elimination. Extra votes MUST be redistributed before elimination or there will be proportion errors in the final result.
PR-RCV Round 1
G🟦(Blue) has more than the required number of votes and is the first winner, receiving a seat. No candidates are eliminated yet, as G🟦(Blue) has 24% of the vote.
PR-RCV Round 2
I🟦(Blue) receives 4% from G🟦(Blue), which is added to I🟦(Blue)’s initial 2%, bringing its total to 6%. H🟦(Blue), having only 4%, is now the candidate with the fewest votes and is set to be eliminated.
PR-RCV Round 3
H🟦(Blue) transfers 1% to I🟦(Blue), increasing I🟦(Blue)’s total to 7%. The remaining 3% from H🟦(Blue) is dropped. This leaves A🟥(Red) with 5%, making it the next candidate to be eliminated.
PR-RCV Round 4
All 5% from A🟥(Red) is transferred to B🟧(Orange), raising B🟧(Orange) to 22%. From this, 2% is transferred from A🟥(Red)’s third-choice voters to C🟧(Orange) bring it to 10%. This leaves I🟦(Blue) with a collective 7%, making it the next candidate to be eliminated.
PR-RCV Round 5
All of I🟦(Blue)’s votes (2%), the 4% from G🟦(Blue), and 1% from H🟦(Blue) are transferred to J🟪(Purple), bringing J🟪(Purple) to 15%. This leaves E🟨(Yellow) with 9%, making it the next candidate to be eliminated.
PR-RCV Round 6
D🟨(Yellow) reaches 20% and gets a seat. C🟧(Orange) is the next to be eliminated.
PR-RCV Round 7
7% from C🟧(Orange) and 1% from A🟥(Red) transfer to F🟩(Green), bringing F🟩(Green) to 20%, securing a seat. The remaining 2% are drop, bringing the total dropped votes to 5%. J🟪(Purple) is the last candidate standing with 15% and is the final winner.
Addressing Autocratic Criticisms
Autocracies criticize imperfect democracies for being internally divisive. Their media criticizes disunity, escalating Brinkmanship. They are right.
PR-RCV is One-Party Compatible
PR-RCV is compatible with One-Party, and No-Party Systems as it pays attention to Individuals, not Factions.
PR-RCV protects against disunity in One-Party States
The ability for voters to cross faction lines ensures no faction can get so much power as to lead to disunity among the general population.
PR-RCV empowers local leadership in One-Party States
In systems with only one faction or no faction, the ability for locals to choose specific individuals brings experience and insight not available to distant centralized party leadership.
Touching on Party List Systems
Voters are compelled to vote for the preferred candidate OR attempt to override the party by achieving a higher threshold. This system seems proportionally representative of the voters, but it is not. It is proportionally representative of the parties.
Closed Party List systems
Candidates are pre-approved by the party or there is a separate exclusive Primary system before the election. The voters cannot select their candidates.
Semi-Open Party List systems
the Party/Faction leaders are still substituting their will for the will of the voters in most cases. Voters can attempt to override party leadership by achieving a higher threshold.
Open Party List Systems
Voters can have more control over direct candidate selection. However, this occurs within the party list itself. Crossing preferences into other party candidates and independent candidates is still near impossible and impractical.
Simulation Results Compared
Original Question: Which of these Four (4) Electoral Systems are best at Uniformly Balancing the Interests of the voters?
Autocratic Voting
Pick One (1), One (1) Winner
The Prevailing Power Structure controls who can stand for election and who can vote. Additional obstacles to suppress opposition are implemented by the power structure to maintain the status quo.
| Candidate | Faction | Count | Vote Share |
|---|---|---|---|
| A | 🟥 Red | 50,000 | 5% |
| B | 🟧 Orange | 250,000 | 25% |
| D | 🟨 Yellow | 200,000 | 20% |
| F | 🟩 Green | 120,000 | 12% |
| G | 🟦 Blue | 300,000 | 30% |
| J | 🟪 Purple | 80,000 | 8% |
Plurality Voting (FPTP)
Pick One (1), One (1) Winner
Plurality Voting, also known as First Past the Post Voting, is a method where the option selected with the most votes win.
| Candidate | Faction | Count | Vote Share |
|---|---|---|---|
| A | 🟥 Red | 50,000 | 5% |
| B | 🟧 Orange | 250,000 | 25% |
| D | 🟨 Yellow | 200,000 | 20% |
| F | 🟩 Green | 120,000 | 12% |
| G | 🟦 Blue | 300,000 | 30% |
| J | 🟪 Purple | 80,000 | 8% |
Ranked Choice Voting (RCV)
Rank up to All, One (1) Winner
Voters rank their candidates putting a 1 next to their first choice, 2 next to their 2nd choice and so on. If the voters preferred candidate is eliminated, their votes are distributed to the remaining preferred candidates.
| Candidate | Faction | Votes | Share |
|---|---|---|---|
| D | 🟨 Yellow | 200,000 | (50%) |
| - F | - 🟩 Green | 110,000 | 11% |
| - J | - 🟪 Purple | 10,000 | 1% |
| - B | - 🟧 Orange | 160,000 | 16% |
| - A | - 🟥 Red | 20,000 | 2% |
| G | 🟦 Blue | 300,000 | (39%) |
| - J | - 🟪 Purple | 30,000 | 3% |
| - B | - 🟧 Orange | 50,000 | 5% |
| - A | - 🟥 Red | 10,000 | 1% |
| - | Dropped | 110,000 | 11% |
Proportional Ranked Choice Voting (PR-RCV)
Rank up to All, Multi-Winner [>=5]
PR-RCV is similar to RCV except there are multiple winners. This can be accomplished by increasing the number of winners per district OR by combining several districts into one larger district.
| Candidate | Faction | Count | Share |
|---|---|---|---|
| B | 🟧 Orange | 170,000 | (20%) |
| A | - 🟥 Red | 30,000 | 3% |
| D | 🟨 Yellow | 110,000 | (20%) |
| E | - 🟨 Yellow | 90,000 | 9% |
| F | 🟩 Green | 120,000 | (20%) |
| C | - 🟧 Orange | 70,000 | 7% |
| A | - 🟥 Red | 10,000 | 1% |
| G | 🟦 Blue | 200,000 | (20%) |
| J | 🟪 Purple | 80,000 | (15%) |
| I | - 🟦 Blue | 20,000 | 2% |
| G | - 🟦 Blue | 40,000 | 4% |
| H | - 🟦 Blue | 10,000 | 1% |
| · | Dropped | 50,000 | 5% |
Result: Proportional Ranked Choice Voting (PR-RCV)
No other system comes close to having the final outcome match the voters interests.
Autocratic Voting
Plurality Voting (FPTP)
Ranked Choice Voting (RCV)
Proportional Ranked Choice Voting (PR-RCV)
Protects Diversity
Supports all political groups all the time.
Breaks Deadlocks
Resolves stalemates in two-party systems using unrepresentative voting methods like First Past the Post.
Enhances Efficiency
Improves the functioning of one-party/No-Party states by removing unproductive incentives in autocratic systems.
Empowers Party Members
PR-RCV Supports all political groups all the time.
Increases Leverage for Legislators
Provides individual legislators more power to represent their jurisdictions in negotiations with faction leadership.
Ensures Neutrality
Enables speakers, chairs, civil officers, and non-political appointees to remain truly neutral by balancing political pressures.
Promotes Cooperation
Encourages cooperative behavior and reduces combative behavior by creating a balanced political environment by making single faction majorities unlikely.